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The relation of self and other is at the thematic heart of two of David
Malouf's novels: An Imaginary Life and Remembering Babylon.1 Characters
demarcate the terms of this relation through their experiences: they endure
alienation, suffer exile, or find themselves estranged from a linguistic
community; they discover a sense of centredness, return to a home, or are
absorbed into a common speech and the life of the community. Both of these
texts have attracted specific critical comment, not all of it positive,
regarding the ways they manifest and explore the self-other relation. Some
reviewers and critics have questioned whether Malouf might not have
passed up opportunities to represent viewpoints other than the consciousness of
the narrator and the central characters, or to explore, in depth, authentic
alternatives to hegemonic cultural paradigms.2 Can a reader of An Imaginary
Life step out from Ovid's consciousness, even momentarily, to take issue
with his world of exile and its inhabitants? Can a reader of Remembering
Babylon gain an insight into the lives of indigenous characters only
glimpsed at the edges of the narrative? While there are sympathetic characters
in both novels who experience and embody cultural exteriority, are readers
able to gain significant insight into their experiences and worldviews?
This essay will identify how the narratives of these two texts open up
distinctive modes of the self-other relation: between characters in the story and
also between the text and the world of the reader. The movement beyond the
boundaries of fiction is an ethical gesture, enjoining the reader to take an active
role in bridging the text with their world. In order to demonstrate how this
process functions in each text, it will be crucial to distinguish the self-other
relation into three terms: the animal and the human (drawing on recent work in
ethics by Giorgio Agamben); the relation between two humans as an I and a
You (drawing on the theology of Martin Buber); and the human and divinity
(drawing on the ethical phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas).3
77
The Self-Other Relation in An Imaginary Life
An Imaginary Life, first published in 1978, provides a first-person narrative
of exile, namely that of the Roman poet Ovid. He is banished from
Augustan Rome and sent out to the remote outpost of Tomis on the Black
Sea coast, not far from the mouth of the Danube River in modern Romania.
Ovid's exile soon develops from its initial conditions of physical and cultural
estrangement. He realises that his entire adult life as Rome's most notorious
poet has amounted to an alienation from an essential humanity last
embodied in childhood. His political exile opens the way for him to return to
an authentic state of being. Ovid is able to make this journey by coming to
understand the people of the village - the barbarians on the fringes of
empire4 - and by his adoption of a wolf-child, a strange visitant who recalls
a lost child of the forest Ovid remembers from his own childhood.
The Animal and the Human
In the early days of his exile in Tomis, among the 'barbarians', Ovid
reflects upon his new surroundings and their essential exteriority to his
civilized lifeworld. He is alienated in his physical displacement, his loss of
language, and his preference to 'wander in a dream' (p. 17), passive and
beyond fellowship. At the same time he is open to his new surroundings and
pays careful attention to the customs of the village and the physical environment
beyond it, if only to comment upon the harshness of village life and the relative
poverty of the land. But before this narrative scene is set in Tomis, the
reader is met with Ovid's reminiscence of Sulmo, his rustic childhood home.
This prefatory passage, set in italic type, signifies a different mode of
consciousness from that of the main narrative. Its dreamlike, diaphanous
temporal frame qualifies Ovid's later attempts to chart his surroundings, and
it instigates the animal-human relation.
The past tense of the very first sentence - 'When I first saw the child I
cannot say' (p. 9) - shifts to the present tense in the second - 'I see myself' -
as memory transforms into bucolic immediacy. The farm scene is given
depth in the description of its vegetal and animal inhabitants: bees move
among the herbs and function as figures of animal society and co-operation;
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a single he-goat, standing on his hind legs, eats vine-shoots, perhaps a
reminder of the link between goat and human in the mythical figure of the
satyr. A goatherd sleeps against an olive bole, 'with his head rolled back to
show the dark line of his jaw and the sinews of his scraggy neck' (p. 9).
These images of jaws and sinews suggest the faintest lupine threat encrypted
within a figure charged with overseeing the safety of the herd. The goatherd
too bears traces of the archaic fusion of animal and human.
The narrator greets the Child in a changing and diaphanous time: 'I am
three or four years old. It is late summer. It is spring. I am six. I am eight' (p.
9). They share the human facility for language, albeit one of their own
devising. The Child is a 'wild boy' who lives among wolves, primary
embodiments of the animal-human relation in the Roman world.5 The narrative
voice asks: 'wolves must have something in their nature which is kindly, and
which connects with our kind, or how else could the child live among them?'
(p. 10). Ovid describes the customary Roman belief in the lycanthrope, the
hybrid being that lives among people in Ovid's world and integrates the
wolf-kind into the human population. The intimacy binding human and
animal in the wolf-man is counterbalanced by the alien nature of wolves at
Sulmo. The narrator tells us that they are from the ravines of the east and are
not of the Roman world. The east is the locus of the archaic: the Greek
world, Phoenecia, Babylon, Persia, and the Asian steppes. It is the source of
the Roman and Latin tribes and thus the ancestry of civilization for Ovid.
The east is a figure of the exotic and the intimate, a primal source of the
Roman world and a threat to it. It is the internal division that defines Ovid's
journey and his coming into understanding, just as the prefatory episode in
Sulmo slips between the actual and the imaginary, between memory and the
dream state.
The wolf is a continuous and varied presence in Ovid's world among the
Getae in Tomis. Wolf-packs circle the village in winter, looking for stray
flock or other sources of food, and they provide a continuing source of fear
for the villagers. The horsemen, marauders from the steppes, are readily
associated with the scavenging canines: 'All night they swirled round and
round the stockade, yowling, yelping like wolves, and the arrows fell' (p.
56). At one point the women of Tomis sacrifice a wild puppy to Hecate: their
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matriarchal religious power is utterly alien to the male villagers and is more
archaic (and therefore, ancestrally, more familiar) than that of the shaman
(pp. 126-8). The wolf-dog, fed on scraps from the village parapets, is linked
to the village but is not of it, just as the women's rites are held beyond the
village gates, out of view.
Ovid's own identity is troubled with dream images of wolves scratching
for his grave: 'Sometimes wolves come, and they claw the earth beside me
[…] I know that whatever it is they are scratching after, I must discover it
before them, or I am lost' (p. 18). The lupine threat takes hold in Ovid's
imagination just when he articulates the vision of his own death: both
images signal the emergence of self-consciousness and the anxieties it
articulates. The ancestral threat to human identity emerges in language from
a reservoir of symbols in the dream state. It evokes the moment of human
separation from the animal by means of a paradox: at no point are humans
more aware of their proximity to animality than at the moment such awareness
distinguishes them from the animal world. This awareness is revisited in
dreams and the irrational.
The animal-human relation reaches a crisis point in the narrative when
the Child is discovered (or rediscovered) in the forests beyond Tomis. The
symbolic threat of animality in human form is reinforced from this point:
Ovid detects the human footprints among the tracks of bears, deer, and
wolves (p. 47), and he experiences great anxiety at the animal fear and the
whimperings issuing from the Child upon his capture. These actions expose
the internal division in the human, the separation of human and animal that
Giorgio Agamben sees as definitive: the human 'is the animal that must
recognise itself as human to be human […] Homo sapiens, then, is neither a
clearly defined species nor a substance; it is, rather, a machine or device for
producing the recognition of the human.'6 This self-consciousness is carried
within the species name of Homo Sapiens:7 the reference to knowledge or
wisdom echoes the imperative to 'Know Thyself', inscribed above the
entrance to the Delphic Oracle in classical mythology.8
The wolf-child in his captivity presents a threat to this fragile identity-
in-separation, and throws Ovid back onto the question of his own humanity.
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As he reacts to his exile from Rome and a corresponding sense of captivity
in Tomis, Ovid too uncovers the proximity of the animal to the human.
Humans bear a capacity for 'world-forming' (Weltbildend), but the boredom
that arises in captivity echoes the animal's 'poverty in world' (Weltarmut)
while simultaneously awakening the human 'from its own captivation to its
own captivation'.9 This openness to and awareness of captivity manifests
itself in Ovid's mind, arousing his lupine dreams and memories of the Child.
Whether the reader decides that the Child is real, a figment of Ovid's
imagination, or a product of his dreams, the recurrence of the wolf-child
returns Ovid to the same question of human identity that he suppressed in
his migration from the pagan world of childhood in Sulmo to the imperial
sophistication of Augustan Rome. In this sense Ovid meets the same Child
at Sulmo and outside of Tomis: both real and imaginary, the Child embodies
the mystery and paradox of human being.
The Human Self and Other
Ovid's exile installs social and psychological facts of otherness. The
barbarian Getae are defined by virtue of their spoken language as other-
than-civilized and this status is reinforced in their social customs and daily
activities. But Ovid chooses to enter into a relation with these people: 'they
are, even so, of our species' (p. 21). He learns their language (he utters his
first word upon waking from a dream) and enters into certain social activities -
going as far as to visit the funerary grounds with the village men on horse-
back, and issuing their ritual cry (pp. 44-5). Ovid's protector Ryzak warms
to him, and the relationship changes from one of apparent duty to one of
reciprocity. Ovid's own sense of humanity comes into new focus as a result
of this relation with the other. However his world remains defined by profound
externality: his sense of isolation is, initially, 'as if I belonged to another
species' (p. 17); the women of the village, Ryzak's mother primary among
them, represent the threat of archaic matriarchal power; the tough physical
world beyond the village is not yet open to Ovid; and that world encompasses
the realm of the marauders, part of humanity but at the most extreme remove.
The introduction of the Child into this economy of positive and negative
human relations brings about a fundamental challenge. The Child embodies
David Malouf
81
and performs the paradox of humanity and animality. His potential to
flourish into a full humanity is countered by his actual inarticulacy. Ovid
first projects himself onto the Child: he teaches the Child to use language
(the language of Rome) and to develop self-consciousness in language. He
is receptive to the growing consciousness in the Child and takes pride in his
small victories. The Child's 'ancestral experience' wells up and has him take
up the stylus (pp. 80-1), and among the manual skills he begins to exhibit,
the most surprising to Ovid is his new capacity to smile (p. 93). Ovid
distinguishes this action from 'mere' laughter: it displays an ability to
communicate with one's self. The Child has become an 'I' and knows what it
is to be an interlocutor or a 'You'. 
But this 'I-You' relation reaches a point where Ovid knows he is required
to alter it if he is to understand the Child, who has 'somehow tumbled into
being' (p. 50). For the Child to become an Other in his own right, or a 'You',
the relation needs to become a truly reciprocal one. The Child teaches Ovid
how to become immersed in the world around Tomis and the Ister, and
teaches him how to interpret natural phenomena. Ovid becomes receptive to
this world by changing his relation to the Child, conceiving of him as a true
subjectivity rather than as an object. He understands the relation to the Other
as the primary responsibility and as a basic condition for his own humanity:
Ovid begins to understand the relational 'language of the spiders' that had
eluded him in the early days of his exile (pp. 21, 97). It is this awareness that
has Ovid take care of and take responsibility for the Child during the illness
of Part IV. This is despite the growing hostility of the old woman when the
fever is transmitted to Ryzak's grandson and eventually causes the death of
Ryzak himself. Significantly, the only other figure to care for the Child
during his illness is the mother of Ryzak's grandson, an exogamous outsider,
who hails from another village.
The relation of self and other here is not based on the priority of being,
on the self as the existential basis from which to encounter an other. Instead
the foundational human act is in taking responsibility for an Other. For the
philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, this taking responsibility is an ethical act
that establishes the possibility of human being itself: it is prior to, and provides
the conditions for, ontology and metaphysics. Yet the structures of language
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are intimately tied up in the notion of being and in the verb 'to be'. Once
Ovid schools the Child in the ways of language, he will be tied to being and
its articulation. They communicate at first with gestures and touch (p. 79),
responding to the proximity of each to the other. This 'pre-original saying'10
is not a negation of being but an exploration of reciprocity (it takes Ovid
time to realise that he is as much the student of the Child as he is the
teacher), the 'otherwise-than-being' from which the human may emerge.
The ethical basis of the I-You relation carries theological resonances for
Ovid. His encounter with and ethical relation to the Child is, from the
beginning, framed by his understanding of the gods, whether the pagan gods
of Sulmo, the Roman pantheon, or the strange gods of the Getae and the
steppes. The theologian Martin Buber explores this ethical theology, where
taking responsibility transforms an 'It' into a 'You' and alters a world of
objects 'at hand' - there simply to be exploited - into a world of reciprocity.11
The Child becomes a human agent for Ovid, whereas the villagers can see
only an uncanny figure straddling the human-animal divide, threatening
their sense of human identity. Yet reciprocity is the primary act that gives
rise to the possibility of being and underwrites it. It brings the Child into
humanity but invests him with the potential for divinity. Ovid's aptitude for
divinity can be found in the way his responsibility for the Child emerges fully
in Part V of the novel, allowing him access to transcendence and to the gods.
The Human and the Gods
From the beginning various manifestations of religious sensibility put
pressure on Ovid's horizon of being, whether they be archaic, native, exotic,
or pagan spirits, or the Imperial Roman pantheon. They challenge the limits
of his world and offer him ways to understand how religious sensibility is
rooted in society and ecology. He learns how the spiritual beliefs of the
Getae are tied to their sparse world, how the ancestral gods he associates
with the women of Sulmo have their own history and value, and how the
Roman pantheon can be emptied of meaning when put to decadent literary
use. Ovid's memory of the Parilia festival of his youth contains a painful
contradiction: by taking the place of his brother in the festival and allowing
a moment of belief to enter into his consciousness, he feels responsibility for
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his brother's death (p. 88). Guilt and regret colour Ovid's relation to matters
of spirit, and come into conflict with his avowed belief in the metamorphosis
into higher states of being.
Ovid alludes to a dim sense of a genetic disposition to transcendence in
the human. He describes a notion of the god within, awaiting the chance to
flower into being: 'We are creating the lineaments of some final man, for
whose delight we have prepared a landscape, and who can only be god' (p.
29). It is difficult to judge whether the author of these statements is speaking
literally or in metaphorical terms. Certainly the Ovid who speaks of matters
of the spirit in earlier passages tries to puzzle through the nature of his
belief. He is open to new modes of spirituality even upon the seemingly
pre-ordained discovery of the Child, and expends much energy attempting
to understand his life of religious experiences: the Priapic oblations of the
Sulmo women and the archaic wood spirits of which they spoke; the Parilia
and its filial obligations; and the shamanistic rituals of the Getae men and
the sacrificial rites to Hecate of the Getae women. Even the appointed hour
with the Child is mediated through expectation and personal belief.
The difference occurs when Ovid, author of The Metamorphoses, under-
stands the potential for change in the Child not in terms of a literary superstition
exerted from without, but tied intimately to the relation he develops with the
Child. After they flee the village, he depends on the Child to take him across
the frozen Ister, to feed him from a sparse and foreign land, and to take
responsibility for his physical welfare. Ovid opens himself to the Child, and
participates in a true reciprocity. His new awareness as a self and as an
other, as an I and a You, allows him to witness (and, in a sense, to produce)
the transcendence of the Child at the end of the narrative. As the Child
seems to take flight, Ovid utters his final words: not 'I am' or 'I am here', but
'I am there'. He is no longer tied to self-identity and the constraints of Being
(or of physical location). He is able to emerge 'there' as the Child's interlocutor
and his participant in opening the way to divinity. The mystery of theology
for Ovid is that it is bound to and produced by earthly being. In a sense Ovid
himself is the god whom he foretold in Part I. Neither he nor the Child can
accomplish spiritual transcendence without the other, and it is in their relation
where spirit finally emerges.
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The profound reach of the self-other relation draws in the animal, human
and divine realms in An Imaginary Life. Ovid puzzles through his own sense
of self and its incarnation in these relations. Ovid's understanding of the true
significance of reciprocity shows how memory, dream, language, ecology,
and society all bind together in an integrated lifeworld, making it possible
for him to face death. The specifications of setting and theme in the novel
can be translated across to the Australian experience: far from the centre of
(in this case, British) empire, a land of ecological extremes, possessed of
strange fauna and of wary human inhabitants (indigenous and newly
settled), the bare, 'new' country offers the exile an experience of unremitting
displacement unless an authentic relation with the land and its custodians is
achieved. The paradox of language - at once shaping one's perception of the
world and confining one's expression to the orders of knowledge and reason
- also must be reconciled if a true relation is to emerge. By retaining the
distance of time and space in his narrative, Malouf avoids reducing it to a
simple allegory of Australian colonial and postcolonial experience. It is the
open nature of the narrative and its ambiguous final episode that enjoins the
reader to explore the ethics of relations to the other and to meditate upon the
creation of being in those relations. The novel's very essence is that of the
open question, or, to adapt Agamben, the question of the open: the human.
Remembering Babylon and the Relation of Self and Other
Remembering Babylon offers further opportunities to think about the
animal-human-divine triad. At first glance instances of animals fulfil relatively
straightforward metaphorical or allegorical functions, rather than stimulate
meditation on the essence and paradox of the human. Janet's bees, for
example, offer metaphors of social co-operation in the animal world.12 The
bees also resonate with Janet's decision to enter a spiritual life. She undergoes
an epiphany 'just at the edge of thought, that she could not catch hold of' (p.
139) while observing Mrs Hutchence's bees. The choice of image is appropriate:
bees play an important iconographic role in the Christian tradition.13 A
striking feature of this epiphany is Janet's 'union' with the 'single mind' of
the swarm of bees (p. 142): her mystical union evaporates the self-other
relation into a transcendental moment, and does so using a 'vehicle' of the
animal kingdom rather than an I-You human relation. Alternatively, the
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brutal and anonymous killing of the geese functions as a warning to the
McIvor family for harbouring Gemmy. It indicates a sense of scale: the
killing of animals warns of potential violence between humans.
A rough correspondence is drawn between the human and animal realms
at specific points in the narrative. At the point where a group of indigenous
women discover Gemmy, the narrative voice performs an inverse blazon:
when they found him he had still been half-child, half-seacalf, his
hair swarming with spirits in the shape of tiny phosphorescent
crabs, his mouth stopped with coral; how, ash-pale and ghostly in
his little white shirt, that long ago had rotted like a caul, he had
risen up in the firelight and danced, and changed before their eyes
into a skinny human child (p. 27).
The correspondence between human child and marine creature is counter-
balanced by gestures toward the spirit world: the crabs and Gemmy's
'ghostly' visage. The narrator mingles the women's perceptions with a literate
sensibility, witnessed in the vocabulary (phosphorescent, caul) and in the
allusion to Ariel's song in The Tempest:
Full fathom five thy father lies.
Of his bones are coral made;
Those are pearls that were his eyes;
Nothing of him that doth fade
But doth suffer a sea-change
Into something rich and strange. (I.2.400-6)14
Ariel sums up Gemmy's situation with consummate precision: he is washed
up in a place as unlikely to the English imagination as Prospero's island. As
Philip Neilsen writes, Malouf draws on the long narrative tradition of the 'lost
child' to draw attention to Gemmy's radically ambiguous status (pp. 202-4): in
the context of the passage quoted above, he is a foundling. According to the con-
ventions of the foundling narrative, Gemmy threatens the stability of the animal-
human-spirit hierarchy, either as a visitant from one sphere to another, or as a
paradox that threatens the collapse of distinction per se.
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Any exploration of the I-You relation in Remembering Babylon must
begin by reconciling Gemmy's radical displacement from stable cultural
relations. Gemmy Fairley points to his ambiguous predicament in his
famous opening words - 'Do not shoot … I am a b-b-British object' (p. 3).
He is from Britain, but has become something else in his seventeen years
living with an aboriginal group in Queensland.15 His discovery by the three
McIvor children at the edge of the family property initiates an ambiguous
'return' to his cultural roots and the measurement of his existential isolation.
Malouf explores the predicament of Gemmy's essential hybridity in a world
unable to assimilate him. Both his protectors and the hostile settlers turn
Gemmy into a fetish on account of his wild speech. It is partly recognisable
as fractured English, but a lack of grammar combined with gesticulations
and facial contortions mark him out as a threat at the limits, and even a
threat to the limits, of the knowable.16 He is the 'black white man' (p. 10)
capable of introducing something alien into the frontier community that will
threaten its already precarious identity. The minister Mr Frazer understands
Gemmy as a split subject, a multiplicity rather than an essence: he calls him
a 'forerunner […] a true child of the place as it will one day be' (p. 132).
The nature of Gemmy's essential hybridity is a subject of some debate.
Does he, in any realistic sense, belong to the indigenous world of Australia?
Does his remnant knowledge of English form a basic component of his identity?
Do his fragmented memories of his abject life in London and at sea comprise at
least a minimal narrative of the self? When Gemmy 'realises' that it is the
record of his life, captured on paper by Mr Frazer and the schoolmaster, that
drains him of life (p. 154), does this knowledge signify a primal superstition, or
does it suggest a more sophisticated conception of self? If anything is clear,
it is that Gemmy's basic existential trauma resides in his inability to cross
the gulf of exile and to come into a fully human inheritance. He is unable to
reach a point of identity, to form an 'I', because no person is able to complete
the journey with him, to conceive of him as a 'You'. Although Lachlan
makes the most strenuous attempts to fully comprehend Jemmy, and
although Mr Frazer and Janet come to appreciate Jemmy's singularity in
retrospect, ultimately they fail. Something has been taken away from Jemmy
in the course of his physical and cultural displacements: he can communicate
with his indigenous counterparts, but also recognises an emptiness within
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himself. He does not fully exist in their world. He reaches toward a white
community that is unable to assimilate him and, in the end, to understand or
tolerate him. Of course the loss is mutual, for the white inhabitants lose the
chance to make authentic contact with their indigenous cousins and gain an
inkling of their world, the consequences of which will continue to shadow
the nation's history.
Perhaps the most contentious aspect of the self-other relation in Remem-
bering Babylon concerns the relative absence of violence toward and by the
indigenous population, and what some critics consider to be the invisibility
of that population in the narrative as a whole. Garry Kinnane sees this
diminished presence as a gloss over reality, an attempt to replace historical
fact with a more positive take on indigenous-invader relations.17 Yet it is
worth pointing out that several sections of the narrative attempt the impos-
sible task of representing a sense of indigenous worldviews: chapter two
narrates the mob of women who discover Gemmy washed up on the shore
and his attempts to seek their protection (pp. 22-5); and chapter twelve nar-
rates the visit of the two indigenous men indirectly from Gemmy's point of
view (pp. 117-20). The narrator attempts to imagine a profoundly alien
sense of time and space, and a fundamentally different worldview. The nar-
rator enacts a paradox: to translate a worldview into another language or
idiom is to diminish or to negate it, and so it must be imagined, imperfectly.
The very registration of radical difference in worldview between indigenous
and invader/settler groups illustrates the difficulty in bridging that differ-
ence, and brings into greater focus the way Gemmy embodies the paradox
of living it. Malouf's characters, particularly Janet, Jock, and, to some
extent, Mr Frazer, embody the hope for future understanding between
human groups, albeit in episodes of ecstatic vision or epiphany.
Malouf attempts to articulate a historically accurate portrait of cultural
and existential polarity and isolation in the early Queensland colony. When
Lachlan tries to trace Gemmy, years later during his work as a labourer in
the far north, the surviving remnants of an indigenous group describe to him
their 'dispersal' six years before at the hands of white cattlemen. This event,
'too slight an affair to be called a massacre', goes unreported in the media of
the day, but the narrator provides a clear picture of the violent deaths
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inflicted upon men, women, and children (p. 196). This episode is men-
tioned in passing, but its sense of outrage is clear: it is difficult to ignore the
underlying irony when the instruments of murder are appraised for their
utility: 'The blacks had been ridden down and brought to earth by blows
from a stirrup iron at the end of a stirrup leather - an effective weapon, when
used at a gallop, for smashing skulls' (p. 196). Malouf draws attention to the
way such disgraceful episodes have been systematically submerged from
white consciousness throughout the nation's European history. On its
surface, the rhetorical tone of the episode performs an anxious rationalisation
of frontier criminality. But if silence is complicity, then understatement is an
emphatically critical tool. Furthermore, Lachlan is led to the site of the massacre
where he finds several parcels of bones lodged, 'in the usual way', in the
forking branches of trees. He decides 'without proof' that one of the parcels
contains the remains of Gemmy, 'whose wandering at last had come to an
end, and this was it' (p. 197). Gemmy had walked out of the narrative and
into the burning landscape years before. His undisclosed fate and Lachlan's
act of remembrance provide allusive analogues to the unknown, undisclosed,
or undocumented indigenous casualties of violence on the frontier, and, by
implication, the oppression and vilification of indigenous peoples generally.
Remembering Babylon does not offer any similar narrative satisfaction
to that of An Imaginary Life. Its resolutions are dispersed among several
characters and across time; varying states of grace, disgrace, and reconciliation
are achieved. Janet comes into a deeper knowledge of her world, but one
modulated by the patterns and harmonies of bees, themselves indicative of
the transcendental mystery enthralling her world. Lachlan's rise to power in
public office, and the consequences of his challenge to public bigotry during
the Second World War do not compensate his essential loss of Gemmy.
Indeed, Gemmy himself walks away from the schoolhouse and out of the
narrative altogether (pp. 180-1). But is there resolution in the mode of his
dissolution from the narrative view? He walks across a charred landscape
after a bushfire, aware of the regenerative powers of the eucalypt forest. He
carries the paper transcription of his story, and as the rains come, the paper
disintegrates, and Gemmy's sense of his own dissolution becomes open to
the land. He hits upon the word water and finds his identity merging with
the land: his authenticity is to be part of the land, fulfilling Mr Frazer's
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prophecy of his role as avatar of the new country. Beyond the self-other
relation and its phases of animal, human, and spirit, Gemmy's being
emerges, or submerges, as part of the fundament, the original clay.
What might the reader learn from the precarious issues of human identity
and its representation in An Imaginary Life and Remembering Babylon? In
terms of the philosophical discourses framing this essay, the essence of the
human emerges in the relation to the Other and in a responsibility for the
Other. Both texts explore this notion at the level of narrative and character.
But the reader is enjoined to take up this theme in bringing the text into their
sphere of experience. Malouf may have decided against a perilous attempt
to speak for indigenous consciousness and a coherent indigenous worldview
in Remembering Babylon, or to narrate a moment of metamorphosis through
death in An Imaginary Life. But his texts place the responsibility for the
other at the centre of their narratives, even when that other exists between
worlds and conveys a fractured, multiple sense of consciousness. Janet may
be a Scottish-Australian mystic by the end of Remembering Babylon, but
she understands something about the way Gemmy has slipped out of their
briefly shared world.
It would seem unbefitting to criticise an author for failing to define a
coherent social agenda that would encompass the themes of his fiction.
Perhaps that is the kind of work that readers are being enjoined to do. The
imaginative act of reading already offers the reader entry into that relation.
In Malouf's fiction it does more than that: it speaks to actual self-other relations
in the world of readers. Malouf does not fully elaborate the social and
ethical implications of specific self-other relations in his texts (such as the
primarily indigenous-settler relations in the case of Remembering Babylon).
It is incumbent upon the reader to fulfil a relational mode of being in reading
the text, and to embody that relation within their own social, cultural, historical,
and personal contexts. It is clear how this project might be undertaken in an
Australian context, not only in the accomplished critical reflections that
respond to Malouf's work, but in an exercise of that essentially human
potentiality: an openness to the worldview of others. As one voice in the
national debate concerning national and cultural identity (and, it must be
said, as a literary voice rather than a voice advocating policy reform or
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ideological partisanship), Malouf offers his readers a way to reconfigure
objective identity into relational identity. How readers choose to respond
will shape the meaning of the very texts themselves.
NOTES
1 David Malouf, An Imaginary Life (1978; New York: Vintage, 1996); David
Malouf, Remembering Babylon (1993; New York: Vintage, 1994). All subsequent
quotations are taken from these editions.
2 See in particular Garry Kinnane's pointedly critical review of Remembering
Babylon, 'Black, White and Red', The Australian Review of Books, April
2001, 7-8. On the other hand, Bill Ashcroft interprets the effect of transcendence
that concludes An Imaginary Life as 'strangely dissatisfying' but identifies it
as a purposeful invitation to the reader to meditate upon issues of postcolonial
identity in language: 'The Return of the Native: An Imaginary Life and
Remembering Babylon', Commonwealth: Essays and Studies 16.2 (Spring
1993), 51-60. Gareth Griffiths also shows how An Imaginary Life produces a
transformative reading of culture that avoids essentialist representations of
pre-colonial and colonial societies, in 'An Imaginary Life: The Post-Colonial
Text as Transformative Representation', Commonwealth Essays and Studies
16.2 (Spring 1993), 61-9. Philip Neilsen appraises the way Remembering
Babylon engages with postcolonial concerns, including its critique of an
enduring historic silence surrounding the violent dispossession of indigenous
people and their removal from ancestral land. Neilsen sees the structural and
generic hybridity of the novel as reflective of this postcolonial sensibility:
Imagined Lives: A Study of David Malouf (St Lucia: University of Queensland
Press, 1996), especially pp. 200-19. 
3 Reference will be made to these principal texts: Giorgio Agamben, The
Open: Man and Animal, trans. Kevin Attell (2002; Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2004); Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Scribner, 1970); Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond
Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague, Boston, and London: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1981) and Entre Nous: On Thinking-of-the-Other, trans. Michael B.
Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).
4 The geographical displacement of the Getae from Rome consolidates their
symbolic role at the threshold of what Ovid considers to be human society:
they speak a language, live in a village, perform religious rites, husband
animals, and grow crops, but at the furthest possible remove from Rome.
They exist on the borderlines of civilisation, too remote to bear strong affinities
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to Ovid's world, but not far enough to erase those affinities altogether.
5 The mythical founding of Rome by Romulus, on 21 April 753 BC, is
premised upon his being suckled as an infant with his twin brother Remus by
a she-wolf: Roman civilisation itself is intimately tied to the violence and
sociability of the animal world. The Capitoline Wolf is the most famous
artistic representation of this myth, and is housed in the Palazzo dei Conservatori
of the Musei Capitolini in Rome. Ironically, this bronze sculpture is not
Roman at all, but Etruscan, and the figures of Romulus and Remus were only
added in the sixteenth century. The founding myth of Rome is recounted in
Book One of Livy, The Early History of Rome, trans. Aubrey de Sélincourt
(1960; Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971), pp. 37-41.
6 Agamben, The Open, p. 26.
7 Agamben notes that Carl Linneaus, the Swedish scientist largely responsible
for modern scientific taxonomy, only appended sapiens to the term Homo in
the tenth edition of his Systema Naturae in 1758. Earlier editions reflected
the conventions of his time, in which the boundary between the human and
other primates was porous and ambiguous (pp. 23-7). It is worth noting that
Linnaeus identifies a variant Homo ferus also in the 1758 edition: the
'enfants sauvages' or 'wolf-children' who 'appear more and more often on the
edges of the villages of Europe, [and] are the messengers of man's inhumanity,
the witnesses to his fragile identity and his lack of a face of his own'
(Agamben, The Open, p. 30).
8 Agamben, The Open, p. 25.
9 Agamben, The Open, p. 70.
10 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being, p. 6. Levinas embarks upon a complex
rethinking of ontology and ethics, seeking to dig beneath philosophy's basis
in being - such as Heidegger's notion of Dasein - to its primordial basis in the
ethical responsibility for the Other. This project quickly hits upon the
paradox of language, in which the expression of the 'otherwise-than-being'
can only arise within the language of being: 'Language permits us to utter, be
it by betrayal, this outside of being, this ex-ception to being, as though
being's other were an event of being' (p. 6). Ovid's narrative performs this
paradox by articulating the pre-linguistic reciprocity he shares with the
Child.
11 Buber, I and Thou, p. 56. Like Levinas, Buber also contemplates the nature
of language within the world of relation: the relation of life with nature
'vibrates in the dark and remains below language' (pp. 56-7); the relation of
life with men [sic] 'enters language'; and the relation of life with spiritual
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beings 'lacks but creates language' (p. 57).
12 The commonplace iconography of bees as social animals is subject to
parodic inversion in Bernard de Mandeville's Fable of the Bees (1714), in
which the private vices of greed and envy are mockingly praised for their
stimulation of public virtues.
13 In the Old Testament Samson kills a lion and returns to the scene days later
to discover a swarm of bees around the carcass and a large deposit of honey
inside. This phenomenon formed the basis for a riddle he told his guests at
his wedding feast (Judges 14:1-20). St Ambrose of Milan (c. 340-397)
became known as the 'honey-tongued Doctor' due to his oratorical skills, and
was often depicted with bees and beehives. He became the patron saint of
beekeepers and chandlers. Bees also came to perform a supporting role in the
Exultet, a hymn of praise recited after the blessing of the Paschal Candle (the
Benedictio caerei) in the Roman liturgy. This hymn was amended in the
reign of Charlemagne to include a section 'In Praise of the Bees', evident in
images contained in the Salerno Exultet Roll (now housed in the Museo
Diocesano in Salerno) and the Barberini Exultet Roll (housed in the Biblioteca
Apostolica Vaticana in Rome). The Roman Barberini family adopted an icon
of three bees as their patrician symbol; in the seventeenth century Maffeo
Barberini (Pope Urban VIII) covered Rome with this symbol during his
papacy. See David Freedberg, 'Iconography between the History of Art and
the History of Science: Art, Science, and the Case of the Urban Bees', in
Picturing Science, Picturing Art, ed. Caroline A. Jones and Peter Galison
(New York and London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 272-96. In Greek mythology
Diana's chastity is often represented in the form of bees (which were thought
to be autogenetic); Priapus is the protector of bees; and Cupid is linked to
bees in Roman mythology.
14 The Norton Shakespeare, gen. ed. Stephen Greenblatt (New York: Norton,
1997), p. 3067.
15 Alice Britten writes that transported convicts were often referred to as
'objects' by their penal overseers in the Australian colonies. In part, this signified
that 'the convicts were no longer British subjects according to law but human
property of the crown'. See Britten, 'B-b-british Objects: Possession,
Naming, and Translation in David Malouf's Remembering Babylon', PMLA
117 (2002), 1159. Malouf's use of this word is strategically effective in
calling attention to Gemmy's desperately marginal existence in England in
childhood, and his evolution into a being that would defy any taxonomy.
16 Writers have long explored the notion of convincing or nearly convincing
imitations of human traits by false entities: vampires, goblins, automata, and
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various hybrid forms. One germane example is E. T. A. Hoffmann's tale 'The
Sandman' (1817). An exploration of repressed fears, false memories and the
function of nemesis, this story has its central character fall in love with an
automaton, mistaking it for a young woman. The narrative draws attention to
the unnatural way in which the 'object' speaks, and its stiff physical contortions
that dupe no one but the hapless Nathanael. In Hoffmann's tale the uncanny
likeness of the automaton to the human form invokes a fear of vulnerability,
of missing the precise difference between the mannequin and its human
model. Compare: 'It was the mixture of monstrous strangeness and unwelcome
likeness that made Gemmy Fairley so disturbing to them, since at any
moment he could show either one face or the other' (Remembering Babylon,
p. 43).
17 Kinnane, 'Black, White and Red', 7, 8.
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